

Party Strategy, Candidate Selection, and Legislative Behavior in Mexico

Sergio J. Ascencio*

Yann P. Kerevel†

Forthcoming at *Legislative Studies Quarterly*‡

Abstract

What explains party unity in legislatures? Prior research suggests when candidate selection and electoral rules create incentives for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, party unity should decline. However, previous theories often treat candidate selection rules as exogenous institutions that have independent effects on legislative behavior despite the fact the choice of nomination rules are often an intraparty issue and a key component of partisan electoral strategies. Here, we develop a theory linking candidate selection rules to party unity through the strategic behavior of party leaders. Our main finding is that, under personalized electoral rules, the effects of nomination rules on legislative behavior are conditional on party's electoral incentives. We test our theory using data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, a case where our results are unlikely to be explained by personal vote-seeking incentives since legislators are banned from seeking reelection.

*University of New Mexico, Department of Political Science. ✉: sergioascencio@unm.edu

†Louisiana State University, Department of Political Science. ✉: ykerev1@lsu.edu

‡Accepted for publication on May 25, 2020

Introduction

What explains party unity in legislatures? Scholars have answered this question by highlighting how electoral systems and candidate selection rules shape the incentives of legislators to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Hix, 2004; Morgenstern, 2004; Shomer, 2009, 2017). When rules create personalizing effects, reelection-seeking legislators will build and emphasize their own individual reputations through their voting record, even if doing so entails acting against their party's best interest (Crisp et al., 2004; Carey, 2007). Therefore, the argument goes, when the institutional environment creates pressures for legislators to cultivate a personal vote, defections from the party line should be more frequent and party unity should decline.

Despite wide acceptance, an extensive empirical literature has generated mixed support for this theoretical argument (Haspel, Remington and Smith, 1998; Poiré, 2002; Hix, 2004; Desposato, 2006; Sieberer, 2006; Rich, 2014). These mixed findings have led to efforts to revise the assumptions and scope conditions of the theory (Depauw and Martin, 2009; Shomer, 2017). Notably, a number of scholars have advocated for conceptualizing candidate selection mechanisms and electoral rules independently, departing from traditional personal-vote accounts that treated the former as part of the latter (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Carey, 2007). For instance, Preece (2014) argues nomination rules lead legislators to forge a “selectoral connection,” which can overpower incentives created by the electoral system, and Shomer (2017) argues the effects of these institutions are conditional upon each other.

A common feature of this institutional literature is that candidate selection rules are often treated as fixed and exogenous. However, this overlooks the fact there are few countries where candidate selection is regulated by law, and that the choice of nomination rules is generally an intraparty issue (Hazan and Rahat, 2010).¹ In fact, many recent studies explain the choice of nomination rules within political parties (Lundell, 2004; Field and Siavelis, 2008; Shomer, 2014), in particular the party leaders' decision to relinquish control and allow the use of more inclusive nomination rules (Langston, 2001; De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002; Poiré, 2002; Meinke, Staton

¹The only major exception are legal mechanisms to increase the descriptive representation of specific groups in legislatures.

and Wuhs, 2006; Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Serra, 2011; Ichino and Nathan, 2012).

Surprisingly, the literatures on the influence of candidate selection rules on legislative behavior, on the one hand, and on the endogenous choice of these rules, on the other, have developed in isolation from each other. In this paper, we connect these two literatures and revisit the relationship between nomination mechanisms and legislative party unity. Our main theoretical claims build upon two insights from the endogenous institutions literature. The first is that candidate selection is a key component of a party's electoral strategy, and thus party leaders are willing to tradeoff some degree of party unity in exchange for improved electoral prospects (Meinke, Stanton and Wuhs, 2006; Serra, 2011). We apply this insight to study the behavior of candidates that are nominated when party leaders control ballot access and argue that, under certain conditions, they will strategically select candidates whose preferences are not necessarily aligned with theirs. Second, the possibility of experiencing costly intraparty conflict can drive party leaders to adopt decentralized nomination rules (Poiré, 2002; Ichino and Nathan, 2012). We extend this claim to argue, once decentralized rules are in place, the risk of triggering intraparty conflict also constrains the party leaders' ability to enforce party discipline by interfering in candidate selection.

Our account complements traditional explanations, which typically link nomination rules to party unity through legislators' personal vote-seeking incentives, by highlighting the importance of a mechanism typically overlooked by the literature: the strategic behavior of party leaders. Since we argue electoral considerations shape party leader behavior at the candidate selection stage, a key implication of our theory is that the relationship between nomination rules and legislative behavior at the individual level should be conditional on the party's electoral incentives. Therefore, whether or not the use of certain candidate selection mechanisms induces legislators to toe the party line depends on the electoral strength of the party in their constituencies. Under centralized rules, which concentrate candidate selection authority in the hands of party leaders, legislators elected in party strongholds should follow the party line more closely than those who ran in more competitive areas. In contrast, when candidate selection is decentralized, legislators from competitive regions

should be less likely to defect from the party line than those from safe constituencies.

We support these arguments using an extensive dataset that combines candidate selection methods and roll call voting behavior from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. There are two reasons that make Mexico an ideal case to study this question. First, the institutional setting allows us to analyze the behavior of legislators elected through different channels, not only with regard to the electoral system but also in terms of candidate selection mechanisms. The chamber is elected using a mixed-member electoral system—300 deputies are elected using single-member district (SMD) plurality and 200 through closed-list proportional representation (PR). More importantly, Mexico is one of several countries where parties consistently employ different candidate selection rules within the same election.² In each legislative election from 2003-2009, each of the three major parties used different rules to nominate SMD candidates: some were appointed by national party leaders, and the rest were nominated by local selectorates. This rich variation, within each political party and within each election, allows us to compare legislators who were not only elected in different tiers but also nominated through different methods, while keeping the party and legislative session fixed.

A second feature that makes Mexico a valuable case study is that, during this period, Mexican legislators were banned from running for consecutive reelection.³ This legal restriction means all opportunities for career advancement were centralized in the hands of party leaders (Kerevel, 2015b),⁴ and thus the incentives to cultivate a personal vote, if any, were minimal. In other words, the institutional environment created incentives for legislators to be more responsive to party lead-

²Many political parties use (or have used) different candidate selection methods in the same election. Several studies exploit this type of variation to study the choice of nomination rules and their effects on several political outcomes, which include parties from: Argentina (De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002; Crisp et al., 2004), Venezuela (Crisp et al., 2004), South Korea (Jun and Hix, 2010), Taiwan (Robinson and Baum, 1993), Ghana (Ichino and Nathan, 2012), Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Warren, 2018). In Colombia, parties are allowed to choose on a district-by-district basis whether the list of candidates is open or closed (Achury, Ramírez and Cantú, 2017). The use of diverse nomination rules by a party in the same electoral process is not restricted to legislative elections. Examples include parties using different rules to select gubernatorial candidates in Japan (Hijino, 2014) and Mexico (Poiré, 2002), as well as mayoral candidates in Italy (Sandri and Venturino, 2016) and Spain (Ramiro, 2016).

³The ban on consecutive reelection was removed in 2014, and federal deputies elected in 2018 will be eligible for reelection.

⁴Independent candidacies were not allowed during this period.

ers that controlled their future careers rather than to the selectorate that made them the party's candidates in the first place. Therefore, studying the Mexican case is particularly useful because, due to this ban on consecutive reelection, the theoretical mechanisms advanced by the personal vote literature are not likely to hold, and thus nomination rules should affect legislative behavior mostly, if not only, through the strategic choices of party leaders.

We find nomination rules are a good predictor of legislative behavior, as measured by the frequency with which legislators vote against the party line. Consistent with our theoretical arguments, we find among SMD legislators who were handpicked by party leaders, those elected in competitive districts defect at higher rates than those who ran in party strongholds. This pattern is consistent with party leaders nominating loyalists in places where the party is electorally dominant, and nominating highly electable but potentially less loyal candidates in more competitive areas. In contrast, among SMD legislators who were nominated via decentralized rules, we observe the opposite pattern. That is, legislators from areas where the party is electorally strong defect more frequently than those from competitive regions. We argue party leaders are less willing to interfere in candidate selection, and to enforce party discipline more generally, in areas where the party's ticket is more valuable, since this increases the likelihood of triggering costly intraparty conflict. Overall, these findings are more consistent with our account, which highlights the factors that shape party leaders' strategic behavior, than with arguments that focus on the legislators' motivations to cultivate a personal vote (e.g., Haspel, Remington and Smith, 1998) or to foster a "selectoral connection" (e.g., Preece, 2014).

Although our evidence comes from Mexico, there are several reasons that make our arguments and findings more generally relevant for the study of how candidate selection rules shape legislative behavior. Most importantly, the building blocks of our theory come from a literature that examines the party leaders' decision to adopt different nomination rules. We borrow insights from these works about the incentives and constraints that shape party leader behavior at the nomination stage and apply them to study how candidate selection shapes legislative party unity. Our account differs from existing works in two important respects. First, we underscore the role of party leaders'

behavior as a mechanism driving the link between party unity and nomination rules. Second, we show that whether certain nomination rules increase or decrease party unity depends on the party's electoral competitiveness; this is not minor, as it could explain the mixed findings in the literature on nomination rules and party unity.

While certain institutional features make Mexico an ideal setting to empirically assess our arguments, there are no elements in our theoretical framework that are specific to the country. In particular, none of our claims rely on the existence of a ban on consecutive reelection. The existence of this prohibition is helpful for our empirical analysis because, in practice, it minimizes the personal vote-seeking incentives of all legislators, independent of any individual attributes, such as the method by which they were nominated or any characteristics of the region in which they were elected. Therefore, this legal provision guarantees our findings are not driven by the legislators' personal vote-seeking behavior.

To be clear, we do not claim that nomination rules have no independent influence on legislative behavior. In fact, we think there are a number of theoretical reasons to expect they should. Instead, our main goal is to draw attention to the fact that the relationship between nomination rules and legislative behavior reveals both the party leader's strategy at the candidate selection stage as well as how these rules shape the legislators' incentives to follow the party line. In this regard, we share Hazan and Rahat's position that the study of candidate selection is essential for understanding the dynamics of party organization, since nomination rules "both reflect the nature of the parties and affect party politics" (2010, 10). We think empirically studying the relationship between candidate selection rules and party unity not only informs our understanding of the effects of these institutional mechanisms on legislators' behavior but also provides valuable insights into how party leaders use these mechanisms in order to balance their electoral and organizational goals.

Nomination Rules, Party Strategy, and Legislative Behavior

Legislative scholars have described two different channels by which centralized nomination rules should lead to higher levels of party unity (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Sieberer, 2006; Kam, 2009; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Preece, 2014; Shomer, 2017). The first

of these is *party cohesiveness*, that is, the degree to which members of a party's legislative contingent share the same policy preferences. Rules that centralize power in the hands of party leaders allow them to nominate candidates whose preferences more closely align to theirs, and are thus more likely to follow the party line. In contrast, when party leaders delegate candidate selection to a different selectorate (e.g., local party branch, primary electorate), the party's legislative group will include more diverse preferences, increasing the opportunities for dissent. It is important to note this mechanism operates *ex ante*, and the way in which leaders foster unity is by screening the candidates' preferences, not by influencing the behavior of elected legislators. Thus, by nominating candidates whose preferences are aligned with the party, the leaders guarantee their legislators will be loyal even when they are voting their own preferences.

Another channel emphasizes how nomination rules limit the party leaders' ability to enforce *party discipline*. Forward-looking legislators motivated by reelection should be more responsive to their future selectorate, that is, the one that will decide whether they are reelected to run for office in the next election. When a candidate's reelection is controlled by party leaders, the incentives to vote against the party line should be minimal, as they can use the threat of deselection to reward loyalty and punish defections. If, instead, a legislator's reelection prospects depend on other actors, they "may foster a connection with their selectorate by defecting from the party line when it conflicts with the wishes of their selectorate" (Preece, 2014, 152). Thus, in contrast to the previous mechanism, this one does relate to the extent to which leaders can influence the behavior of legislators, regardless of the legislators' true preferences.

Our main theoretical claims relate to both of these mechanisms. We agree nomination rules affect the party leaders' ability to shape the degree of cohesiveness of their party's legislative body and to enforce party discipline. However, we incorporate insights from the literature on the endogenous choice of nomination rules to provide a different view of how these institutions shape party leader behavior. There are two ways in which this literature informs our work. First, we assume that candidate selection often forces party leaders to balance competing goals. Specifically, we argue the party leaders' ability to use their control over candidate selection to increase

party unity is constrained by electoral considerations. This view contrasts with traditional accounts, which implicitly assume party leaders nominate candidates with the goal of maximizing party unity—overlooking the fact that candidate selection is a key component of a party’s electoral strategy.⁵ Second, this literature has noted party leaders’ actions at the candidate selection stage are constrained by the possibility of triggering intraparty conflicts. We argue the leaders’ decision to decentralize candidate selection (in the first place) reveals information about the party’s internal politics and, more importantly, about their ability to enforce party discipline upon adopting decentralized rules. Below, we elaborate these arguments and discuss how these considerations shape party leader behavior under different nomination rules.

Centralized Nomination Rules and Party Unity

Following literature on the endogenous choice of nomination rules, we assume candidate selection presents party leaders with a choice that often involves a tradeoff between two competing goals (Meinke, Staton and Wuhs, 2006; Adams and Merrill, 2008; Serra, 2011). On the one hand, party leaders have organizational goals, which include policy-related objectives, as well as “protecting the party reputation and thus maintaining the value of the party label” (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, 35). On the other hand, they have electoral objectives, such as mobilizing the electorate and winning office. If leaders only cared about their organizational goals, they would nominate candidates who are expected to follow the party line, regardless of their electability. Throughout, we use the labels “aligned candidates” and “loyalists” to refer to this type of politician. Similarly, if the leaders’ sole motivation was electoral, they would nominate popular, high-quality candidates who can win elections, regardless of whether or not they expect these candidates to follow the party line.

Ideally, a party would have candidates who are both highly electable and loyal to the party label. Since this is not always possible, when deciding whether to nominate (or reselect) a candi-

⁵Scholars typically assume centralized nomination rules translate into increased party cohesiveness *mechanically* (e.g., Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Sieberer, 2006; Kam, 2009). For instance, (Shomer, 2017, 68) argues “party leaders [are] better able to control the composition of the party’s label if selection processes are centralized. . . ensuring *a priori* that the party’s legislative fraction will be ideologically cohesive.”

date, party leaders often face a tradeoff between these two goals. The extent to which a leader is willing to tradeoff some degree of partisan alignment for better electoral prospects, we argue, is partially shaped by the electoral rules. In party-centered electoral systems (e.g., closed-list PR), the electability of individual candidates is relatively less important, and thus the leaders can safely nominate aligned candidates. For this same reason, these systems facilitate the enforcement of party discipline, as party leaders can easily deselect disloyal legislators, regardless of their individual electability. In contrast, under candidate-centered electoral rules (e.g., SMD plurality, single non-transferable vote), the candidates' electability is relatively more important, and thus party leaders may have to choose between expected loyalty and electability.

When will party leaders prefer a highly electable maverick over an electorally hopeless loyalist? We argue the importance leaders attach to a candidate's electability, relative to their expected loyalty, decreases as the party's electoral strength increases. The reason for this is, in places where the party is popular, the marginal benefit of having a high-quality candidate is relatively smaller. In the extreme, in areas where a political party is dominant, the additional benefit of having an electable candidate is close to zero, and thus leaders can simply choose aligned candidates.

The same logic applies in terms of enforcing party discipline through the threat of deselection; in places where the party is dominant, the leaders' cost of deselecting legislators who do not follow the party line is low, even if they are highly electable. As the party becomes electorally weaker, the relative weight leaders attach to the candidate's electability increases, as having a high-quality candidate could make the difference between winning and losing the election. Similarly, the threat of deselection becomes less credible, since replacing an electable maverick with a loyal but less electable candidate would likely result in an electoral defeat, which relative to tolerating some party disloyalty entails a higher cost for party leaders.

To summarize, the preceding discussion suggests under certain conditions party leaders will strategically nominate (and reselect) candidates that are highly electable, even when their policy preferences are not aligned with theirs, over loyalists who have low chances of winning office. This incentive is present when two conditions hold: (1) the electoral system is candidate-centered,

and (2) the party is not electorally dominant, and thus having an electable candidate can affect the outcome of the election. Therefore, if the electoral system is party-centered, we expect party leaders to nominate aligned candidates. Similarly, our expectation is that, in candidate-centered electoral systems, party leaders will nominate aligned candidates in party strongholds, and non-aligned but electable candidates in more competitive areas.

Hypothesis 1. Among deputies appointed by their party leaders, those elected in the PR tier and SMD party strongholds should be more likely to follow the party line than those elected in competitive SMDs.

Decentralized Nomination Rules and Party Unity

How does candidate selection decentralization affect party cohesiveness? Under decentralized nomination rules, party leaders delegate the task of nominating the party's candidates to a different body, usually referred to as the selectorate (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Although the selectorate might take different forms (e.g., primary electorate, delegate convention, local party branch leaders), the key feature of decentralized rules is an agent other than the party leadership is in charge of selecting the party's candidates. Because the selectorate may have different priorities or may not share the party leaders' preferences, decentralizing candidate selection creates an agency problem. That is, delegating candidate selection might produce outcomes that differ from those preferred by party leaders.

The use of decentralized nomination rules can decrease party cohesiveness. Numerous scholars have noted once party leaders put a different agent in charge of choosing the party's nominees, this agent will nominate candidates that best represent their own policy preferences rather than those of the party leadership (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Carey, 2007). In Preece's words, "when other actors—local voters in a primary election or local party branches, for example influence [ballot] access... they can choose politicians with personal beliefs that differ from the central party, decreasing the underlying level of ideological cohesion of the party's legislative caucus." (2014, 152). The degree to which decentralized rules decrease party

cohesiveness depends on the preferences of the selectorate relative to those of the party leaders. In other words, as the gap between the selectorate's and the party leaders' preferences becomes wider, the degree of party cohesiveness should decrease (Gerber and Morton, 1998; Meinke, Staton and Wuhs, 2006; Serra, 2011).

As long as leaders can effectively enforce party discipline, a decrease in party cohesiveness need not translate into party disunity. Traditionally, decentralized rules are associated not only with lower cohesiveness but also with lower party discipline (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Bowler, Farrell and Katz, 1999; Kam, 2009; Shomer, 2017). While we generally agree with this view, we also recognize that, regardless of the nomination rules in place, party leaders have a number of tools at their disposal to influence their party's candidate selection process. For instance, party leaders can snatch power away from the selectorate, either by changing the party's nomination rules in a way that guarantees a more favorable outcome or by bypassing the party's formal rules (Friedenberg 2003; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Hazan and Rahat 2010). Similarly, leaders can use their clout within the party, and even invest material resources, to favor the nomination (or deselection) of specific candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Ichino and Nathan, 2012).

The key question, then, is under what conditions are party leaders more likely to interfere in candidate selection in order to enforce party discipline? We believe this calculus is analogous to that of whether or not to adopt decentralized nomination rules in the first place, and thus draw on insights from the literature on the endogenous choice of candidate selection methods to answer this question. We focus on a set of works that explain the decision to delegate candidate selection to a different agent as driven by intraparty divisions (Poiré, 2002; Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Ichino and Nathan, 2012). According to these works, party leaders relinquish their control over ballot access in order to moderate internal conflicts that could hurt the party organization and the electoral prospects of the party's nominees. Consequently, party leaders are more likely to adopt decentralized rules when intraparty conflict becomes more salient, and thus the potential costs from it are greater (Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Ichino and

Nathan, 2012).

Once decentralized nomination rules are in place, party leader interference in candidate selection in order to discipline a rebellious legislator might create backlash and trigger costly intraparty conflict between party leaders and the party's selectorate (Jackson 1968; Ichino and Nathan 2012; Katz and Mair 2018). While overall we expect the ability of party leaders to enforce discipline of legislators nominated under decentralized rules to be lower, we expect party leaders to be less capable of disciplining legislators from areas where the party is electorally dominant compared to areas where the party is electorally weaker. This expectation is driven by two distinct but related mechanisms. Specifically, a party's electoral strength shapes two factors that drive the leaders' decision to interfere to enforce discipline: (1) the likelihood of future internal conflict over candidate selection, and (2) the potential costs derived from it. Below, we describe each mechanism in more detail.

First, the likelihood that party leader interference triggers an internal conflict is increasing in the value of the party's nomination (Key 1956; Jewell and Olson 1978; Shale and Mathlosa 2008; Ichino and Nathan 2012). Under decentralized rules, enforcing party discipline requires party leaders to interfere in candidate selection, preventing the selectorate from choosing the party's nominees. While this type of interference could always put the party leaders and the selectorate at odds, the likelihood it escalates into costly internal conflict is greater where the party is electorally dominant. The reason is the party's electoral prospects determine the stakes of the conflict. In places where a party is more popular, the chances of winning office upon obtaining the party's nomination are greater. Thus, there is likely to be greater intra-party competition over securing the nomination. Central party branch interference into the nomination process is very likely to trigger conflict between local and national party leaders. By contrast, in places where the election is expected to be more competitive, and thus the prospects of winning are less certain, there is less at stake and thus the chance that national party leader interference triggers conflict between party branches should be lower.

Second, electoral outcomes are an indicator of the strength of the local party organization,

and more powerful actors within the party can create greater costs⁶ for party leaders in the event of intraparty conflict (Tavits 2011; 2012; Hankla and Manning 2016). From the perspective of party leaders, intraparty conflict is potentially more costly in areas where the party is electorally stronger (Ichino and Nathan, 2012). In other words, if the party leaders' interference triggered conflict with the local party branch, we would expect weaker party branches to inflict lower costs on party leaders than more powerful branches. For this reason, under decentralized rules, party leaders should be more likely to discipline legislators from areas where the party is electorally weaker. Consequently, among legislators nominated through decentralized rules, those from areas where the party is electorally stronger should be more likely to defect from the party line than those elected from more competitive areas. This logic was best explained by (Tavits, 2011, 925), who notes "MPs from more powerful subunits can pursue local or personal interests... with less fear of punishment by party leadership, than MPs from less powerful branches. Since the central party leadership depends crucially on powerful subunits, they are more likely to overlook and not punish dissenting behavior by [their] MPs."

Hypothesis 2. Among SMD deputies nominated by local selectorates, those who ran in party strongholds should be less likely to follow the party line than those who ran in competitive areas.

Political Institutions and Legislative Politics in Mexico

We empirically study the relationship between nomination rules and party unity using data from Mexico during 2003-2012. Our focus is on the three major political parties during the period of study: *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), and *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD).⁷ Although these parties use different formal procedures to compile their PR lists, all PR nominations are tightly controlled by national party leaders (Nacif

⁶According to Ichino and Nathan (2012, 771), these costs result from local party branches "withholding support for their [party's] parliamentary and presidential candidates." This would only be costly in places where the party is expected to win. In contrast, losing an election where the party is electorally weak does not entail a cost for the leaders. Similarly, in Tavits (2011)'s framework, these costs result from the fact that strong local party organizations perform tasks and control resources that are essential for the national party leaders.

⁷Together, these parties' candidates won all 300 SMD seats in 2003 and 2009, and 297 of them in 2006.

2002; Freidenberg 2013; Langston 2017).⁸ All three parties have experimented with different nomination rules across SMDs. In each election, a subset of each party's SMD candidates were appointed by the national party leaders and the rest were nominated by local-level selectorates.⁹ We exploit this rich variation to explore the influence of candidate selection on legislative behavior.

Our theoretical framework draws on two claims from the literature on the endogenous choice of nomination rules. Before moving to the results, we provide some qualitative evidence these claims hold in the Mexican case. First, we argue electoral considerations are a central component of candidate selection. More specifically, our claim—which is at the core of Hypothesis 1—is that party leaders are willing to tradeoff some party loyalty in exchange for better electoral prospects. A key piece of evidence in support of this argument comes from trends in the use of different nomination rules over time. Traditionally, PAN and PRD nominated their candidates for legislative office through inclusive rules; however, starting in 2000, after the presidential election that ended the PRI's seven decades of hegemonic rule, both parties started using more exclusionary rules that significantly increased the national party leaders' influence (Wuhs, 2008; Freidenberg, 2013). The logic behind this transformation was well explained by a former member of the PAN's National Executive Committee (CEN):

Since our chances of winning were so low, they [our internal elections] ended up being “democratic parties” in which the loser would support the winner, the winner would invite the loser to join their team, and so on. Even very early on, after the party started winning some elections, this model worked well. . . Then, in 2000, and even more so in 2003 and 2006. . . obviously the incentives changed. . . in order to guarantee that the party would have good candidates. . . the CEN had to step in and started appointing candidates in many districts.¹⁰

Freidenberg (2013, 187) also describes how the adoption of centralized nomination rules was very closely linked to the goal of nominating more electable candidates, which leads her to conclude “the maximization of electoral benefits over programmatic issues has been increasingly com-

⁸PRI list composition is controlled by the party's national leaders (Langston, 2017). PAN and PRD include candidates who are suggested by state party branches, but their rules guarantee national leaders can place their aspirants at the top of the lists.

⁹In Appendix B, we discuss the composition of each party's local-level selectorate.

¹⁰Interview conducted by authors. Mexico City, July 2014. Audio available upon request.

mon. . . This has been abundantly clear in the candidate selection processes in Mexico.”¹¹ Equally important, there is evidence that parties’ electoral prospects in each district constrain the types of candidates nominated. A party official explains how electoral pressures call for candidates with different attributes; in some districts, party leaders have favored candidates “with capacity to mobilize the electorate” and in others they have nominated “ candidates of ‘the party’ (bureaucrats, officials). . . ” (Freidenberg, 2013, 184).

The transformation of the electoral landscape also forced the PRI to redefine its candidate selection strategy. According to Langston (Langston, 2006, 396), during the non-competitive era, the party leaders’ motivations behind the choice of candidates did “not include their popularity with the voters, but rather. . . other goals, such as building factional support and strengthening the leaders position.” After 2000, in order to remain competitive the PRI had to recruit candidates who, despite weaker connections to national party leaders, were perceived to be more capable of winning elections. Consequently, “electoral competition forced the hand of the CEN. . . belonging to a national PRI faction was no longer the basis of winning the nomination” (Langston, 2006, 405). Party leaders within the PRI also had to become more responsive to the preferences of other actors within the party, in particular governors, who demanded legislative candidacies for their allies in exchange for mobilizing the PRI vote in their states (Langston, 2006).

This last point is closely connected to our second theoretical claim, which is the party leaders’ capacity to sway candidate selection is constrained by party politics and the possibility of triggering costly internal conflicts. As mentioned before, party leaders are more likely to decentralize candidate selection when both the likelihood and the potential costs of intraparty conflict are greater, and we extend this logic—in Hypothesis 2—to the party leaders’ decision to interfere in candidate selection in order to enforce party discipline. There is extensive evidence that intraparty factors shape the choice of nomination rules in Mexico (Poiré, 2002; Langston, 2006; Wuhs, 2008; Bruhn, 2010; Freidenberg, 2013). Decisions over PRD candidate selection methods are often tied

¹¹This interpretation is well illustrated by an interview with a PAN official, “some appointed candidates are external people who do not have close ties to the party. . . sometimes there are politicians who switch parties and join the PAN. The way that works is you have to appoint them, they would not be able to win an internal election.” Interview conducted by authors. Mexico City, July 2014.

to the numerous factional divisions within the party. The PRD is divided between multiple leadership groups that control different blocks of voters and compete with each other over candidacies (Mossige, 2013). Primary elections are often held as a result of pressures from these different factions (tribus) who would rather compete in a primary than negotiate candidacies among the party leadership (Bruhn, 2010; Freidenberg, 2013).

Similarly, PAN intraparty politics are a key determinant of nomination-rule choice. When asked how the CEN decided whether to appoint a candidate or to allow a primary, a former PAN chairman argued this choice was driven by the goal of having the most electable candidates possible; at the same time, he also explained the CEN faced *de facto* constraints that made it less likely party leaders would interfere in candidate selection. He stated:

We always sought that our choices were guided by electoral competitiveness, not by our initial preferences. . . that the [candidate selection] process resulted in the nomination of the best possible candidate, the one who would allow us to win the election, and not let our a priori personal or group preferences. . . prevent us from obtaining that result. . . There were some regions in which it was unthinkable that the CEN could interfere in the party's internal life, and thus we would allow the [candidate selection] processes to follow their natural course [primaries]. . . it was essential to take into account the real factors of power in the region. Local party leaders often had something to say and we would always listen.¹²

Perhaps the best indicator of the importance of intraparty considerations is uncovered by analyzing the choice of nomination rules across SMDs. From the perspective of party leaders, the best possible scenario involves controlling candidate selection in party strongholds. The reason is twofold. In regions where the party is electorally dominant, retaining control over candidate selection means that: (1) party leaders can select loyalists, even if they are not particularly electable, and (2) the party leaders' candidates will most likely be elected.

Therefore, if party leaders faced no constraints within the party, the use of centralized nomination rules should be more common in party strongholds. Existing research shows, however, this is not the case (Poiré, 2002; Ascencio, 2018). Instead, consistent with the literature that explains the

¹²Interview conducted by authors. Mexico City, July 2014.

adoption of primaries as being driven by intraparty conflict (e.g., Kemahlioglu, Weitz-Shapiro and Hirano, 2009; Ichino and Nathan, 2012), party leaders have regularly used decentralized nomination rules in places where their party is electorally dominant and retained control over candidate selection in areas where the party is less popular. In his study of PRI gubernatorial candidate selection, Poiré (2002, 123) finds primaries were more frequent “where the PRI had a larger preference among voters.” Similarly, (Ascencio, 2018) finds PAN and PRD were significantly more likely to adopt legislative primaries in their strongholds. A descriptive analysis of our data reveals similar patterns; Table 1 summarizes the relationship between the choice of nomination rules by the district’s electoral competitiveness.

Table 1: Use of nomination rules by type of electoral district (SMDs)

TYPE OF ELECTORAL DISTRICT	NOMINATION RULE	
	Centralized	Decentralized
Weak	1,103 [72%]	431 [28%]
Competitive	277 [48.3%]	297 [51.7%]
Weak	233 [39.4%]	359 [60.6%]
<i>Total</i>	1,613 [59.7%]	1,087 [40.3%]

Note: Numbers in square brackets are row percentages. The sample includes all 300 SMDs for each of the three political parties (PAN, PRI, PRD) in three legislative elections (2003, 2006, 2009). For each party, an SMD was classified as stronghold (weak) if the party’s average margin of victory in the previous three elections was greater than the median value of 7.4 (less than -7.4) percentage points; all other SMDs were classified as competitive.

Table 1 confirms party leaders are significantly more likely to appoint candidates in places where they are less popular. Party leaders appointed almost three out of every four legislative candidates in SMDs in which their party is electorally weak; in contrast, they allowed local-level selectorates to nominate three out of every five legislative candidates in SMDs where their party is electorally dominant. As mentioned above, these trends are consistent with intraparty considerations shaping the party leaders’ choice of nomination rules. Although we cannot directly show

that once candidate selection has been decentralized party leaders will refrain from interfering in regions where the party is electorally stronger, we believe these patterns are highly suggestive.

Data and Methods

To test our hypotheses, we gathered data from Mexico's Chamber of Deputies across three legislative terms from 2003-2012. Roll call data were collected from the *Gaceta Parlamentaria*,¹³ background characteristics of individual federal deputies were collected from the *Sistema de Información Legislativa*,¹⁴ and candidate selection data were collected from the *Instituto Nacional Electoral*.¹⁵ Our analysis is limited to these three terms and focuses solely on the three major parties due to limitations on the availability of candidate selection data for other parties and terms.

Our main outcome of interest is defection from the party line. Defections in the Mexican Chamber are relatively uncommon and make up only 1.4 percent of all votes, although 86 percent of deputies have defected at least once.¹⁶ The dependent variable counts the number of each deputy's defections. To generate this variable, we first determined a party's position on each vote as the way in which a majority of the party voted.¹⁷ A defection is defined as a vote contrary to the majoritarian position of a deputy's political party.¹⁸ We use a Poisson regression with robust standard errors where each individual deputy is the unit of analysis.¹⁹ In all models, we exclude alternates (*suplentes*) and party switchers.

Our first independent variable of interest is the method of candidate selection. Since Mexico uses a mixed-member electoral system, candidate selection is divided into three categories: SMD

¹³<http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/>

¹⁴<http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/>

¹⁵<http://www.ine.mx/archivos2/portal/ConsejoGeneral/SesionesConsejo/acuerdos/>

¹⁶Defections are most common among the PRD and least common among the PAN.

¹⁷In Appendix A, we show our results are robust to defining a defection as voting differently than the party's caucus leader.

¹⁸We do not count abstention votes as defections, only yes or no votes depending on the party's majority position. We recognize abstentions (and potentially absences) may also be strategic (Rosas and Shomer, 2008; Rosas, Shomer and Haptonstahl, 2015). In Appendix A, we show our results are similar if we include abstentions and that only modeling abstentions produces similar trends. However, defections are clear signals, while abstentions, and especially absences, are somewhat harder to interpret.

¹⁹This model specification produces nearly identical results to negative binomial regression without making distributional assumptions about the error term. See Dube, Dube and García-Ponce (2013) and Cameron and Trivedi (2010).

deputies selected through primaries or other local selectorates, SMD deputies appointed by party leaders, and PR deputies appointed by party leaders. We create two dichotomous variables measuring the different ways in which SMD deputies were selected, and use PR deputies as the excluded category.

The other independent variable of interest is a measure of district party competitiveness, since we expect the effects of candidate selection methods to vary based on district-level party strength. To measure a party's district electoral strength, we average a party's margin of victory, calculated as the party's vote share minus that of its rival with the most votes, over the previous two elections. For example, the measure of the PAN's district electoral strength for 2009 is the average of the PAN's margin of victory in the same district in 2003 and 2006.²⁰ We then interact this measure of party competitiveness with the candidate selection method used in each district.

To test the first hypothesis, which is limited to those deputies appointed by party leaders, we also need to define which districts are considered party strongholds and which districts are considered competitive. To identify which SMDs are considered strongholds for each party, we identify the median value of our measure of party competitiveness and code districts as strongholds where the average margin of victory in the previous two elections is greater than the median value of 7.4 percentage points. While this decision is arbitrary, our results are robust to a variety of specifications as we demonstrate in Appendix A.

We also include a number of control variables that may be related to voting defections. Importantly, we control for the presence of co-partisan governors. Governors are considered important actors in Mexican politics with substantial sway over the behavior of co-partisan deputies (Cantú and Desposato, 2012; Langston, 2010; Rosas and Langston, 2011). Therefore, we control for shared partisanship between deputies and governors from a deputy's home state at the start of the legislative term.

²⁰This variable was adjusted to reflect the 2005 redistricting process. Redistricting involves grouping the smallest electoral unit, electoral precincts, into new districts. Since the composition of electoral precincts is not affected by the process, it is possible to use precinct-level data to reconstruct results from previous elections. Therefore, for post-2005 elections, the measures from pre-2005 elections were obtained by aggregating precinct-level results of pre-2005 elections according to their post-2005 districts.

In addition to accounting for co-partisan governors, we control for the presence of gubernatorial elections in a deputy's home state during their term. Prior work finds subnational elections have a strong influence on legislative behavior (Kerevel, 2015b; Rosas and Langston, 2011). If governors serve as key legislative principals, deputies from states with outgoing governors may have greater incentives to be loyal to national party leaders in order to secure a future political appointment, thus decreasing incentives to defect on roll call votes (Kerevel, 2015a,b).²¹

In all models, we account for party identification and legislative term to capture any unexplained variance related to contextual factors within parties and legislative terms. We also account for sex, age, and the educational level of deputies. Additionally, we include dummy variables to indicate whether or not a deputy has previous legislative experience, and whether or not a deputy served as committee chair.

Results

Table 2 presents the main results. Model 1 tests our first hypothesis, which focuses exclusively on appointed deputies. This model compares the likelihood of defecting across PR deputies (excluded category), SMD deputies appointed in strongholds, and SMD deputies appointed in competitive districts.²² We expect deputies nominated by party leaders, in both the PR tier and in SMD strongholds, will be less likely to defect. However, in competitive districts we expect party leaders to nominate electable candidates, even when they may be less loyal, and thus more likely to defect. The results of Model 1 lend support to this hypothesis. As seen in Figure 1, SMD deputies appointed in competitive districts are expected, on average, to defect from the party line on about 6.5 votes, compared to 4.3 votes for those appointed in party strongholds. Also apparent in Figure 1 is that rates of defection between deputies appointed in party strongholds and those appointed to PR lists are virtually indistinguishable.

²¹(Kerevel, 2015b) finds more than 50 percent of deputies seek future ballot nominations over which party elites control, while less than 15 percent of deputies obtain appointed positions controlled by governors.

²²This model excludes all deputies nominated in primaries.


Table 2: Determinants of defections from the party line
in Mexico's Chamber of Deputies, 2003-2012

	DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DEFECTIONS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
SMD appointed (party stronghold)	-0.091 (0.125)		
SMD appointed (competitive district)	0.306** (0.104)		
SMD appointed			-0.123 (0.102)
Margin of victory		0.923** (0.425)	1.399** (0.404)
SMD appointed × Margin of victory			-2.360** (0.477)
Co-partisan governor	-0.144 (0.092)	0.124 (0.103)	-0.085 (0.094)
Gubernatorial election	-0.541** (0.104)	-0.023 (0.112)	-0.312** (0.098)
LX Legislature	-0.487** (0.118)	-0.547** (0.154)	-0.561** (0.103)
LXI Legislature	0.286** (0.107)	-0.587** (0.13)	-0.194 (0.122)
PAN	-0.737** (0.1)	-0.989** (0.135)	-0.878** (0.089)
PRD	0.579** (0.099)	0.724** (0.191)	0.610** (0.115)
Education	0.065** (0.029)	-0.03 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.027)
Age	0.007 (0.004)	0.016** (0.006)	0.013** (0.004)
Legislative experience	-0.115 (0.082)	0.088 (0.1)	-0.015 (0.084)
Female	-0.038 (0.093)	0.171 (0.124)	0.081 (0.108)
Committee chair	-0.076 (0.104)	-0.039 (0.117)	-0.042 (0.098)
Constant	1.390** (0.313)	1.465** (0.393)	1.782** (0.304)
Observations	747	557	843
AIC	5116.2	4576.2	6971.8
Pseudo R ²	0.189	0.297	0.298
Wald χ^2	270.1	263.00	349.00

Notes: Poisson regression with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is a count of the number of voting defections from the party majority. Significance levels are as follows: p : * <0.10 ; ** <0.05 , two-tailed. Model 1 includes PR deputies and SMD deputies appointed by party leaders. Model 2 includes SMD deputies selected in primaries. Model 3 includes all SMD deputies (appointed by party leaders and selected in primaries).

Model 2 tests our second hypothesis, according to which the effect of party primaries on defections is conditional on district party support. Primaries are likely to increase defections in party strongholds as national party leaders are less willing to risk intra-party conflict by disciplining legislators from strong local party organizations. In contrast, national party leaders face fewer costs in disciplining legislators from districts where the party is electorally weak. Model 2 shows that as the margin of victory increases in a district, deputies selected through decentralized nomination methods are increasingly likely to defect.

Figure 1: Electoral system, party competition, and roll-call defections
(Deputies appointed by national party leaders)



Notes: Predicted number of defections as a function of type of *appointed* deputy (holding all other variables at their median values) and 95% confidence intervals. Estimated from Model 1 (Table 2).

Our two hypotheses make different predictions about the effects of competition on the probability of defecting from the party line based on the method of candidate selection. Among appointed SMD deputies, we expect deputies from party strongholds to be more likely to follow the party line (H1), whereas among SMD deputies nominated in primaries we expect deputies from strongholds to be less likely to follow the party line (H2). We test these expectations together in Model 3, which includes SMD deputies appointed by party leaders and selected in primaries, and interacts the selection method with the party’s average margin of victory in a district. To facilitate the inter-

pretation, Figure 2 shows the predicted number of defections by margin of victory and nomination method, while holding all other variables at their median values.²³ We find deputies nominated by national party leaders in the least competitive SMDs are expected to defect about seven times from the party line, compared to about three defections from deputies appointed in strongholds. Previous work on party unity in Mexico fails to find an association between electoral competitiveness and roll-call defections (Weldon, 2005). Our analyses reveal this association is strong but conditional on candidate selection rules.

Some examples may help clarify this relationship. In districts where a party has performed poorly in the past, party leaders are willing to appoint outsiders as candidates given weak party organization on the ground. In 2006, PRD leaders appointed Carlos Roberto Martínez Martínez as a candidate in Oaxaca's 4th district. In the past, the PRI had dominated this district, winning the seat in 1997, 2000 and 2003. In the previous two elections prior to 2006, the PRD had come in third place, behind the PAN. Thus, the PRD was not a strong competitor in the district, which was further reflected by the PRI winning the seat in 2009. Martínez Martínez had no prior background in the PRD's party organization or any other party organization, but was an incumbent non-partisan indigenous mayor in a small municipality.²⁴ Unsurprisingly, in office he defected from the PRD's majority position on 14 votes. This case illustrates one of our main theoretical arguments, according to which party leaders are, under certain conditions, willing to trade some degree of party unity for more votes. In our account, PRD leaders would only handpick an electable outsider like Martínez Martínez in districts where the party is electorally weaker and need a high-quality candidate to win the race.


In contrast, in party strongholds, political parties tend to appoint party loyalists. In Puebla's 14th district, the PRI appointed Jorge Estefan Chidiac as their 2006 candidate. While Estefan Chidiac did face stronger competition from the PRD, he still won by six percentage points. In the previous three elections, the PRI won with at least 55% of the vote, while PAN and PRD roughly

²³Appendix C provides details on the estimation of the predicted counts show in Figure 2.

²⁴Many indigenous municipalities in Oaxaca state do not run partisan elections, but elect leaders under indigenous customary law (*usos y costumbres*).

split the opposition vote. Estefan Chidiac had previously served in the Chamber under the PRI, winning the 13th district in 1997, and has been active in the PRI's party organization since 1979. While in office, he did not defect on a single vote.

Figure 2: Nomination rules, party competition, and roll-call defections (Deputies elected in single-member districts)



Notes: Predicted number of defections as a function of nomination method and margin of victory (holding all other variables at their median values) and 95% confidence intervals. Estimated from Model 3 (Table 2).

In Figure 2, we also find deputies nominated by local selectorates in party strongholds are the most likely to defect among all SMD deputies. For example, in 2009, Ramón Jiménez López won the PRD's primary for the Federal District's 1st district and then won the election. From 1997-2012, the Federal District was the PRD's major electoral stronghold before losing ground to MORENA. In the 1st district, the PRD won in 1997, barely lost to the PAN in 2000, and then dominated by winning over 50% of the vote in 2003 and 2006. Jiménez López had been active in the PRD's formation in 1989, and continued to be active in the party organization until 2012. He is also known to be further to the left than many other PRD deputies. During this legislative term,

divisions within the PRD grew between some of the more radical factions and the moderate party leadership, which was evident in the 58 votes where Jiménez López defected from the PRD. After this term, he joined many other PRD politicians to form the new MORENA party. Here is a clear example where national party leaders were unable to discipline a strong local party organization that chose a candidate unlikely to follow the party line.

In sum, we find relatively strong and consistent support for our theory that the effects of candidate selection rules are endogenous to partisan electoral strategies. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, centralized nomination rules may be used to elect party loyalists in electoral strongholds, or they may be used to nominate more electable candidates in competitive districts who are less loyal to legislative party leaders. Consistent with prior research, we also find in Figure 2 decentralized nomination rules used in electoral strongholds may lead to the election of legislators disloyal to party leaders.

Conclusion

Prior literature on candidate selection has focused on how nomination rules shape party unity by creating differential incentives for legislators to engage in personal vote-seeking behavior. Yet, much of this work has ignored that candidate selection is an essential component of party electoral strategy. Here, we draw on a well-established literature on the endogenous choice of nomination rules, to argue the influence of nomination rules on legislative behavior should be conditional on electoral considerations.

The main theoretical contribution of this study is we propose a mechanism driving the relationship between nomination rules and party unity overlooked by existing work: the strategic behavior of party leaders. Equally important, we provide empirical evidence for this mechanism using data from Mexico, where personal-vote seeking incentives are minimized due to the lack of consecutive reelection, and thus the observed patterns are most likely explained by our proposed mechanism. Our results suggest future work on candidate selection effects needs to more seriously consider how party leaders use these rules to balance potentially conflicting goals, which means the behavioral effects created by nomination rules are likely to vary across parties, districts and time.

We acknowledge in settings where legislators do have incentives to foster a personal-vote, the two mechanisms will be at work and interact in possibly unexpected ways. For instance, existing research typically assumes building a personal-vote is detrimental for party leaders, since legislators will sometimes face incentives to defect from the party line. In contrast, our work highlights the existence of a loyalty-electability tradeoff that often drives party leaders' decisions. Thus, where building a personal-vote matters, party leaders could be better off with legislators who develop a strong personal vote, even if this results in decreased party unity, than with legislators who risk losing a seat in the next election by blindly following the party line. Although studying this type of interaction exceeds this paper's scope, we believe our findings suggest promising avenues for future research.

References

- Achury, Susan, Margarita Ramírez and Francisco Cantú. 2017. "Endogenous ballot structures: The selection of open and closed lists in Colombia's legislative elections." *Electoral Studies* 49:136–154.
- Adams, James and Samuel Merrill. 2008. "Candidate and Party Strategies in Two-Stage Elections Beginning with a Primary." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2):344–359.
- Ascencio, Sergio J. 2018. Electoral Competition, Party Politics, and Candidate Selection in Mexico PhD thesis.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell and Richard S. Katz. 1999. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. The Ohio State University Press.
- Bruhn, Kathleen. 2010. "Too Much Democracy? Primaries and Candidate Success in the 2006 Mexican Elections." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52(4):25–52.
- Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2010. *Microeconometrics Using Stata*. Stata Press.
- Cantú, Francisco and Scott W. Desposato. 2012. "The Rise of Federal Politics in Mexico's Legislative Branch." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 19(4):3–38.
- Carey, John M. 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1):92–107.
- Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote." *Electoral Studies* 14(4):417–439.
- Crisp, Brian F., Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2004. "Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 66(3):823–846.
- De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones and María Inés Tula. 2002. "Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes?: Candidate Nomination in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(4):413–436.
- Depauw, Sam and Shane Martin. 2009. Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective. In *Intra-party Politics and Coalition Governments*, ed. Daniela Giannetti and Kenneth Benoit. Routledge.
- Desposato, Scott W. 2006. "The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies." *Journal of Politics* 68:1018–30.
- Dube, Arindrajit, Oeindrila Dube and Omar García-Ponce. 2013. "Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico." *American Political Science Review* 107(3):397–417.
- Field, Bonnie N. and Peter M. Siavelis. 2008. "Candidate Selection Procedures in Transitional Polities: A Research Note." *Party Politics* 14:620–639.

- Freidenberg, Flavia. 2013. Dedazos, Elecciones y Encuestas: Procesos de Selección de Candidatos a los Diputados Mexicanos en Perspectiva Comparada. In *Selección de Candidatos y Elaboración de los Programas en los Partidos Políticos Latinoamericanos*, ed. Manuel Alcántara Sáez and Lina María Cabezas Rincón. Tirant Lo Blanch.
- Gallagher, Michael and Michael Marsh, eds. 1988. *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. The Secret Garden of Politics*. SAGE Publications.
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Rebecca B. Morton. 1998. "Primary Election Systems and Representation." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 14(2):304–324.
- Haspel, Moshe, Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith. 1998. "Electoral Institutions and Party Cohesion in the Russian Duma." *Journal of Politics* 60:417–39.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. and Gideon Rahat. 2010. *Democracy within Parties. Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford University Press.
- Hijino, Ken victor Leonard. 2014. "Intra-party conflicts over gubernatorial campaigns in Japan: Delegation or franchise?" *Party Politics* 20(1):78–88.
- Hix, Simon. 2004. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics* 56(January):194–223.
- Ichino, Naomi and Noah Nathan. 2012. "Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(4):1–23.
- Jun, Hae-Won and Simon Hix. 2010. "Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 11(2):153–171.
- Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party discipline and parliamentary politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kemahlioglu, Ozge, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Shigeo Hirano. 2009. "Why Primaries in Latin American Presidential Elections?" *The Journal of Politics* 71(1):339–352.
- Kerevel, Yann P. 2015a. "Pork-Barreling without Reelection? Evidence from the Mexican Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40(1):137–66.
- Kerevel, Yann P. 2015b. "(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents: Patronage and Political Careers in Mexico." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(8):1020–50.
- Langston, Joy. 2001. "Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33:485–511.
- Langston, Joy. 2006. "The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution: Electoral Competition and Decentralized Candidate Selection." *Party Politics* 12(3):395–413.
- Langston, Joy. 2010. "Governors and 'Their Deputies': New Legislative Principals in Mexico." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35(2):235–258.

- Langston, Joy. 2017. *Democratization and Authoritarian Party Survival: Mexico's PRI*. Oxford University Press.
- Lundell, Krister. 2004. "Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 10:25–47.
- Meinke, Scott R., Jeffrey K. Staton and Steven T. Wuhs. 2006. "State Delegate Selection Rules for Presidential Nominations 1972-2000." *Journal of Politics* 68(1):180–93.
- Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. *Patterns of legislative politics: Roll call voting in the United States and Latin America's southern cone*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mossige, Dag. 2013. *Mexico's Left: The Paradox of the PRD*. Lynne Rienner.
- Poiré, Alejandro. 2002. Bounded Ambitions. Party Nominations, Discipline, and Defection: Mexico's PRI in Comparative Perspective. PhD thesis Harvard University, Government Department.
- Preece, Jessica Robinson. 2014. "How the Party Can Win in Personal Vote Systems: The "Selectorial Connection" and Legislative Voting in Lithuania." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(2):147–167.
- Ramiro, Luis. 2016. "Effect of party primaries on electoral performance: The Spanish Socialist primaries in local elections." *Party Politics* 22(1):125–136.
- Rich, Timothy S. 2014. "Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed-Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39:113–35.
- Robinson, James A. and Julian Baum. 1993. "Party Primaries in Taiwan: Footnote or Text in Democratization?" *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 22(2):88–99.
- Rosas, Guillermo and Joy Langston. 2011. "Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators." *The Journal of Politics* 73(2):477–493.
- Rosas, Guillermo and Yael Shomer. 2008. "Models of Nonresponse in Legislative Politics." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23(4):573–601.
- Rosas, Guillermo, Yael Shomer and Stephen R. Haptonstahl. 2015. "No News is News: Non-ignorable Nonresponse in Roll-Call Data Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2):511–528.
- Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sandri, Giulia and Fulvio Venturino. 2016. "Primaries at the municipal level: how, how many and why." *Contemporary Italian Politics* 8(1):62–82.
- Serra, Gilles. 2011. "Why primaries? The party's tradeoff between policy and valence." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 23(1):21–51.

- Shomer, Yael. 2009. "Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(7):945–70.
- Shomer, Yael. 2014. "What affects candidate selection processes? A cross-national examination." *Party Politics* 20(4):533–46.
- Shomer, Yael. 2017. "The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42(1):63–96.
- Sieberer, Ulrich. 2006. "Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12(2):150–78.
- Tavits, Margit. 2011. "Power within Parties: The Strength of the Local Party and MP Independence in Postcommunist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4):922–35.
- Warren, Shana S. 2018. "Democratizing Candidate Selection: Evidence from Botswana's *Bulela Ditswe* Primaries." Working paper.
- Weldon, Jeffrey. 2005. "Institutional and Political Factors of Party Discipline in the Mexican Congress Since the End of PRI Hegemony." ITAM: Working Paper.
- Wuhs, Steven T. 2008. *Savage Democracy: Institutional Change and Party Development in Mexico*. The Pennsylvania State University Press.